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We consider incentives for innovation under various market structures when the new
product must compete against an old version for the same customer base. Competition and
monopoly in the old product market provide identical incentives when (1) the monopolist is
protected from new product entry, and (2) innovation is nondrastic in the sense that the
monopolist supplies positive quantities of both old and new products. If the monopolist is
threatened with entry, monopoly provides strictly greater incentives. These results contrast with
the familiar finding that competition provides greater incentives for process innovations.
Welfare may be greater under monopoly when innovation is valuable.
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1. Introduction
There are two key aspects to the invention of new products. First, product
innovations tend to be gradual and build on closely-related older technologies. Second, new
products typically do not immediately replace the old versions. Rather, old and new products
compete for the same base of customers, even if the new product is far superior in its
attributes - as when the new product is more costly and its users do not equally value the
product improvements. There are many examples of product innovation, both dramatic and
trivial, that possess these features. 1
Despite the historic significance of this kind of gradual innovation, economists know
very little about the connections between intergenerational product competition and the
incentive to engage in innovative activity. Theoretical investigations have focussed chiefly
on innovations that reduce the cost of producing existing products (e.g. Kamien and Schwartz
[1982], Loury [1979]), as opposed to innovations that are embodied directly in new products.
A major feature of these process-innovation models is that sellers of the old-generation
technology are assumed to play no active role in the market. As we show in this paper,
however, the incentive to innovate is crucially affected by rivalry between old- and
new-product sellers. Further, traditional conclusions concerning market structure and
innovation will no longer hold in the presence of intergenerational product rivalry.
We propose a model in which old and new generations of a product compete for
consumers who vary in their valuation of product improvements. The seller of the new
product captures consumers with high valuation, but the old product continues to be attractive
1 Some rough quantitative evidence on the importance of gradual product improvements is given
by Scherer [1980, p. 409]: in a 1977 survey, firms reported that 28% of R&D effort went into
development of new products, 59% into improvement of existing products and 13% into
reducing the costs of existing manufacturing processes.
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to lower-valuation consumers if it is offered at a lower price. The structure of the old
product market may be either competitive or monopolistic. Within this framework we ask
the question, which market structure maximizes the rents obtainable from the new product, as
measured, for example, by the licensing revenue of a patent-holding inventor who controls
the new product?
The comparison of market structures hinges on two effects. The replacement effect,
introduced in Arrow's [1962] analysis of process innovation, holds that innovation is less
attractive to a monopolist, since part of the returns from the new product simply replace
monopoly rents already earned on the old. We identify a new effect: when the old product
is competitively supplied, competition from firms producing the old product reduces the
profits of the new product supplier. This product inertia effect makes innovation relatively
less attractive under competition, since the old product monopolist internalizes this
externality when it adopts the new product.
We demonstrate that, for an important range of demand conditions, the replacement
and product inertia effects exactly offset when (1) the old product monopolist is protected
from entry by another new product supplier, and (2) innovation is nondrastic in the sense that
a joint monopolist supplies positive quantities of both old and new products. This implies
that competition and protected monopoly provide identical incentives for innovation. When
the old monopolist can be threatened by a new product entrant, monopoly provides strictly
greater incentives. These findings stand in sharp contrast to the familiar result that
competitive markets provide greater returns to process innovation.
Our analysis clarifies the conditions under which monopoly is socially preferable due
to its effect on innovation. We first consider the case in which total R&D costs are not
heavily affected by rivalry to discover the new product. Since a protected monopoly
provides no greater incentive to innovate than does competition, social surplus under
competition must be greater. A threatened monopoly may, however, bring forth innovation
that does not occur under competition, and threatened monopoly becomes superior when the
value of innovation is great enough to outweigh the allocative efficiency of competition.
These welfare rankings may be altered if total R&D spending is very sensitive to innovative
rivalry, and in such cases product inertia may actually enhance welfare by slowing the pace
of innovation, thereby reducing R&D costs. We illustrate the latter point below by means of
a simple deterministic patent race model.
This paper contributes to a long-established tradition associated with Schumpeter,
which emphasizes the importance of monopoly power for spurring innovation. Schumpeter
argued that excessive competition in the market for the new product destroys innovation
incentives, while our results show that competition in the old product market may be
detrimental as well. Further, we develop ideas of Lange [1943] and Brozen [1951], who
argue that product innovations may be discouraged relative to process innovations due to
competition from old products.
More recent literature on patent rivalry (Dasgupta and Stiglitz [1980], Gilbert and
Newbery [1982]) demonstrates that an established monopolist will have greater incentive to
acquire a preemptive position in a new product than would an entrant, and therefore
monopolies will tend to persist. This result and our conclusions arise from the same basic
source: monopoly increases the returns from innovating by internalizing competitive
externalities. The monopoly persistence result, however, hinges on the assumption that
introducing the new technology preempts all rivals, while our basic conclusions continue to
hold under various conditions of rivalry in the innovation activity and structure of
new-product supply, as we show below.
Finally, this paper relates to the recent work on growth theory that emphasizes
product improvements as the major source of growth, especially Stokey [1988, 1991], Aghion
and Howitt [1990] and Grossman and Helpman [1991a,b]. In focusing on aggregate issues,
these papers rely on very stylized specifications of market structure and interproduct
competition, and our work can be viewed as a first step in analyzing product improvements
and growth in richer and more realistic structural settings.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses several historical examples of
intergenerational product competition, which serve to motivate our analysis. Section 3
outlines our basic model, and Section 4 compares the incentives to innovate under
competitive and monopolistic structures of the old market. Section 5 compares the social
surplus generated by competition and monopoly, and Section 6 extends our analysis to allow
for rivalry in the innovative activity, i.e. patent racing, as well as oligopolistic rivalry in the
new product market. Section 7 concludes the text. Proofs of propositions are given in
Appendix 1, and Appendix 2 further develops the equality-of-returns result by showing that
either protected monopoly or competition may provide greater returns for appropriate
perturbations of the utility functions.
2„ Examples of Intergenerational Product Competition
The historical record is replete with examples of innovations which, while being
widely recognized as superior, displaced old technologies only gradually or incompletely.
Consider first one of the most important product improvements of the late Nineteenth
Century, the steel rail. Temin [1964] and Attack and Brueckner [1982] show that for the first
two decades of its marketing, the principle use of Bessemer steel was for rails. Despite
steel's superior durability, especially under heavy loads, iron rails continued to compete with
steel. This was because steel rails were more costly until the late 1880's, and on less
intensively used lines the extra durability of steel did not pay for its added cost. Iron rails
were completely replaced only after the cost of steel finally dipped below that of iron.
The history of the mainframe computer is full of new inventions of systems with
greater speed and internal memory. Each user would agree that the new systems offered
superior performance, but not all desired the improvements enough to make up for their
added cost. Old and new generations of computer technology, both from the same firm and
from competing firms, often simultaneously existed and competed for the same base of
customers (Fisher, McKie and Mancke [1983]). As is well known, old generations were
retired only after the costs of incorporating new capabilities had declined sufficiently.
Consumer markets provide many illustrations of intergenerational product
competition. Consider the invention and improvement of household articles (Panati [1987]).
Early aluminum cookware replaced cast iron pots, and later teflon-coated cookware competed
against cheaper uncoated, although in each case the preceding generation has stayed in the
market. Development of the electric blender has seen many minor (and sometimes costly)
improvements, valued more by some consumers than by others, and not all immediately
adopted - e.g. ice-crushing attachments, the coffee grinder head, and the capability of
multiple speeds. Other examples of this kind of gradual innovation include the toaster, which
evolved from a bread-baker to the automatic pop-up model, and the lawn mower, where
manual rotary-blade mowers competed against more expensive motorized versions.
These examples illustrate two main points. First, since product innovations typically
involve improvements that are not valued equally by all buyers, the postinnovation customer
base tends to be segmented into those who value the improvements highly and buy the new
product, and those who place less value on the improvements and stick with the old version.
Competition between old and new products occurs at the margin between these two customer
classes.
Second, while reductions in the cost of producing the new product might finally serve
to drive out the old, the returns realized by the innovator may derive primarily from the
initial phase of rivalry between old and new products. This could be due to discounting, to a
slow pace of process improvements, or to difficulties an initial innovator may have in
appropriating rents generated subsequent to the process improvements. In such cases,
incentives to innovate are .closely connected to the nature of intergenerational product
competition.
3. A Model of Intergenerational Product Competition
To capture these salient aspects of innovation, we propose the following model, which
will form the foundation of our subsequent analysis. There is a basic good that comes in old
and new versions. We assume that production technology for the old version exhibits
constant returns to scale, with Cq denoting its per-unit production cost. Variable production
costs for the new product are constant at C^. In addition, the new product requires R&D
costs, which we will consider in Sections 5 and 6.
Further, there is a continuum of consumers with heterogeneous tastes, indexed by co e
[0,1], who are uniformly distributed on this interval with total mass one. Each consumer
demands either zero units or one unit of the basic good, and either the old or the new product
can be chosen. Let Pq and P^ be the prices of the old and new products. The net utilities
for consumer co purchasing the old and new products are given by f^(co) - Pq and vfN(co)
-
Pj^t, where v > 0. The utility of not purchasing is zero. 2
We assume that fQ(co) and fN(0)) are twice continuously differentiable, and that fr\(0)
= fvr(0) = 0. In addition we suppose fA(o)), f^(co) > for all co, so that higher co indicates
stronger preference for the basic good, and that fQ(l) > Cq, so that the old product is viable.
Define v > by:
yfN(l)-CN = f (l)-C
For v < v the new product is not a viable competitor against the old, so we henceforth require
v > v. Assume further that fA(co) < vf^(co) for all co; this implies that consumers co > are
2 Similar specifications of vertically differentiated product markets-have been considered bv
Gabszewicz and Thisse [1979,1980] and Snaked and Sutton [1982,1983].
willing to pay a greater amount for the new product, and also that the premium is greater for
consumers with higher co. For technical purposes, we assume vfV(a)) < fA'(o)) < for all co
(e.g., as a sufficient condition for concavity of profit functions). Finally, we impose the
condition fi^(O) < Cq, which is motivated below.
Figure 1 illustrates these demand conditions for prices Pvr > Pq > 0. As shown,
consumers with ctkr < co < 1 maximize utility by purchasing the new product, those with co~
< co < Okr purchase the old product, and those with < co < au choose to make no purchase.
The marginal consumers cu^ and ox^ are determined by:
W - po = °
f
O<V " P = vfN (CV - PN
Manipulating these equations and setting Qq = oXr - G)q and QN = 1 - ox. gives the inverse
demand functions:
(la) P = f (l - Q - QN)
(lb) PN = vfN(l - QN) - f (l - QN) + f (l - Qq - QN)
Our analysis will focus chiefly on three types of postinnovation market structures. In
each case the new product is taken to be monopolized, e.g. by a patent-holding inventor, but
the structure of the old product market is varied. The cases are: (I) joint monopoly, in
which a single firm monopolizes both the old and new products; (2) dominant-fringe
structure, in which the old product is supplied competitively; and (3) differentiated duopoly,
in which the old product is monopolized by a firm distinct from the new product monopolist.
In the dominant-fringe case, we assume that the dominant firm has a fust-mover advantage in
choosing quantities, while for differentiated duopoly we presume Nash equilibrium in
quantity choices. Postinnovation market structures in which the new product need not be
monopolized will be considered in Section 6b.
We will say that the new product represents a drastic innovation if the presence of the
old product has no effect on the maximized profits of the new product monopolist, i.e. the
latter may simply act as if the old product did not exist. This notion is analogous to Bain's
[1949] concept of blockaded entry, where the old product suppliers are thought of as entrant
firms. If the presence of the old product constrains the new product monopolist, then
innovation is nondrastic.3 Regions of drastic and nondrastic innovation under the three
market structures are characterized in the following proposition, whose proof is given in
Appendix 1:
A B A R
Proposition 1. There exist v and v , satisfying v < v < v , such that (i) under joint
A A
monopoly, innovation is nondrastic if v < v < v , and drastic if v > v ; and (ii) under
dominant-fringe structure and differentiated duopoly, innovation is nondrastic if v < v < v ,
and drastic if v > v .
Observe that under joint monopoly, innovation is nondrastic for a strictly smaller
range of v than under dominant-fringe and differentiated duopoly structures. In proving the
proposition, we invoke the condition f^(0) < C^ to rule out the possibility that innovation is
nondrastic for all v.4
3 Arrow [1962] defines a process innovation to be drastic if and only if the monopoly price
under the new technology lies below the competitive price under the old technology; hence the
profits of a monopolist operating the new technology are unaffected by the existence of the old.
Our notion of drastic innovation is an extension of this basic idea to the case of product
innovation.
4 To see how the latter may happen, consider the case of joint monopoly and suppose the
monopolist chooses Q^ = 0. The elasticity of demand for the new product at Q~ = is, using
(lb), £(QN) = fN(l - Qxr)/f^(l - Qm)Qvt- N°te tnat demand elasticity is independent of v and
strictly decreasing in QN . Profit maximizing choice of QN given Q~ = requires e(Qxr) > I.
4. Returns to Innovation
We now turn to the central question of our paper: what market structure generates the
greatest returns to innovation? More specifically, how does the structure of intergenerational
product competition impact on innovation incentives? To clarify matters it is convenient to
frame the question in terms of Arrow's [1962] conceptual experiment, in which the
innovation is controlled by a patent-holding inventor, whose returns are generated by
licensing revenue. Thus the question becomes, what market structure allows the inventor to
earn the greatest possible revenue?
One can distinguish two channels by which innovation is affected by intergenerational
product competition: first, on the demand side, the old and new products are imperfect
substitutes; and second, on the supply side, various structural links between old and new
products may limit firms' abilities to market the new product. These factors lead us to
consider four possible preinnovation market situations. This first is (1) competition, in which
the old product is competitively supplied and any firm may produce the new product. In this
case the products are linked only by the structure of demand. The remaining cases, which
posit monopoly in the old product market, are: (2) protected monopoly, in which the old
product monopolist is the only firm that is capable of producing the new product, e.g.
because of specialized factors of production controlled by the monopolist; (3) threatened
monopoly, in which any firm, including the old product monopolist and new entrants, may
adopt the new product; and (4) excluded monopoly, in which only new entrants may produce
Further, let Q^ denote the smallest level of QN such that the marginal profitability of the old
product at Qq = is nonpositive. As long as e(Qj^) < 1, it is never be optimal for the
monopolist to choose QQ = 0, no matter how large v is. The condition f^(0) < CU implies
/ A
£xt(Qxt) > 1, however, and innovation becomes drastic once v reaches the critical level v .
Similar comments apply with respect to the other market structures.
10
the new product, e.g. due to legal restrictions.
Consider first the competitive case. Here the inventor may license to as many firms
as desired, and he can appropriate any profits generated by the new product by means of
r
licensing fees. Denote by n the profits earned by the new product monopolist under
C
dominant-fringe structure; thus n gives the maximum licensing revenue of the inventor,
which the inventor may obtain by licensing to a single firm that becomes the new product
monopolist.
The situation is different under protected monopoly, in that the inventor can license
only to the old product monopolist. By adopting the new product the latter earns the joint
M
monopoly profits, denoted n , less the licensing fee, and adoption will be chosen only if
these postadoption profits exceed what the monopolist would have earned by simply keeping
its old product monopoly; profits in the latter case are written n . Thus, n - n
gives the maximum licensing revenue available to the inventor under protected monopoly.
Competitive market structure provides greater returns to the inventor than does
protected monopoly if n > n - n , which can be reexpressed as:
n
OM nM . nC
On the left-hand side we have the difference between firms' opportunity costs of adoption
under protected monopoly and competition, which is certain to be strictly positive. This is
the replacement effect discussed by Arrow, and it may be seen that the effect tends toward
giving competition the advantage as far as innovation incentives.
On the right-hand side we have the difference between the total benefits of adoption
under competition and monopoly, and this will be strictly positive as long as the new product
does not completely displace the old. This is a new effect: competition from the old
product, which takes the form of a competitive fringe of old product suppliers, limits the
11
rents that can be extracted from the new product. The old product acts as a drag on the
incentives to adopt the new; hence, we call this the product inertia effect. Note that this
effect tends toward providing greater incentives under monopoly.
Since the replacement and product inertia effects cut in opposite directions, it is not
immediately clear which market structure provides greater incentives for innovation. In fact,
we can show that when protected monopoly leads to nondrastic innovation, i.e. when a joint
monopolist supplies positive quantities of both old and new products, the two effects exactly
offset, and protected monopoly and competition provide precisely the same returns to
innovation. This remarkable result hinges on the relationships between pre- and
M M
postinnovation quantities. Let Qq and QN denote the quantities supplied under joint
monopoly, QN the new product supply under dominant-fringe structure, and Qq the
monopoly supply of the old product when the new product has not been adopted. In
Appendix 1 we prove the following:
Lemma. If v < v < v , then:
(a) Qq = Qq + Q^r, i.e. the protected monopolist's total output is the same whether or
not it adopts the new product; and
M C
(b) Qxt = Qvr, i.e. output of the new product under joint monopoly is identical to output
under dominant-fringe structure.
The Lemma places important restrictions on the equilibrium quantities when
innovation is nondrastic under joint monopoly. To develop some feel for these restrictions,
let us express the profit function of the joint monopolist in terms of the total output Q = Qq
+ Q^ and the new product output QN ; using (la) and (lb), we have:
12
(2) [fQ(l - Q) - CQ][Q - QN] + [vfN(l - QN) - fQ(l - QN) + fQ(l - Q) - CN]QN
= [f (l - Q) - CQ]Q + [vfN(l - QN) - fQ(l - QN) + CQ - CN]QN
Observe that on the right-hand side of (2), profits have been decomposed into two
components, with one component depending only on Q and the other depending only on Q^.
Part (a) follows from the fact that the Q component has exactly the same form as the profit
function of a nonadopting monopolist. Essentially, the total quantity produced in the
nondrastic case hinges on the marginal old product purchaser, and under our demand
structure this purchaser's behavior is the same whether or not the monopolist adopts the new
product.
Part (b) is a bit more subtle. Note first that under dominant-fringe structure, the
competitive fringe imposes an "implicit tax" on the new product supplier; using (la), (lb)
and Pq = Cq, we may express the new-product price as:
(3) PN = vfN(1
- QN) ' {fO(1 - QN) - C }
The implicit tax is given by the term in braces. Similarly, the existence of the old product
reduces the new product price under joint monopoly, but the effect is more complex since the
monopolist earns profits from both products. Note however that in the QN component of the
right-hand side of (2), the effective new product price is exactly the same as (3). Since the
implicit tax is the same in each case, the incentives to produce the new product are also the
same.
The equality of implicit tax rates is explained by two effects. First, the existence of
the old product under joint monopoly directly reduces P^ by an amount L-Jl - Qvr) - Pq, as
can be seen in (lb). When innovation is nondrastic, however, the joint monopolist reduces
13
its sales of the old product at a one-to-one rate when it sells additional units of the new; this
imposes an added tax of P^ - Cq, which is the profit margin on the old product. The sum of
these effects yields an implicit tax rate that is identical to the level under dominant-fringe
structure.
We now establish Fl = n -II . Using the Lemma and (2), maximized profits
under joint monopoly may be written:
n
M
= [f(l - Q0M) - C ]Q0M + [vfN(l - q£) - fQ(l - q£) + c - cn]q£
= n
0M
+ nc
which establishes the result. In essence, the implicit tax rates under dominant-fringe and
joint monopoly structures serve as per-unit measures of the product inertia and replacement
effects, respectively. Equality of the tax rates directly reflects equality of the two effects.
For innovations of greater value, in particular those that are drastic under joint
monopoly but not under dominant-fringe structure, the product inertia effect is partially
C N A B
attenuated by the fact that QN > QM when v < v < v . As a consequence, competition
provides strictly greater returns than does protected monopoly. The arguments supporting
this result are given in Appendix 1, and here we summarize with:
Proposition 2. (a) If v < v < v , then n = n -II , and competition and protected
monopoly provide the same returns to innovation;
(b) If v > v , then fl > fl - fl , and competition provides strictly greater returns.
The equality of returns shown in part (a) of Proposition 2 establishes that competition
and protected monopoly can provide equal incentives to innovate under reasonable market
14
conditions. It is appropriate to ask, however, whether the equality is part of a larger weak
inequality over a broader class of demand conditions, or whether equality itself holds up for
broader conditions. This question is addressed in Appendix 2, where it is shown that by
appropriately perturbing the utility functions in the v < v < v case, either competition or
protected monopoly may provide strictly greater returns; thus equality should be interpreted
to mean that returns will be very close over a large range of demand conditions, but that it is
possible for either market structure to provide greater returns.
Now consider the case of threatened monopoly, in which the inventor can license the
innovation to any firm. As with competition, the inventor does best by licensing to whatever
number of firms maximizes industry profits, and the latter is accomplished by selling the
rights to a single firm. If this firm is a new entrant, then by adopting the innovation it earns
ND
the new product monopolist's Nash equilibrium profit, given by n , less the licensing fee,
as adoption leads to a differentiated duopoly that pits the entrant against the old product
monopolist. The opportunity cost of adoption for the new entrant is the normal profit rate,
i.e. zero.
If the inventor sells to the old product monopolist, then the latter's profits upon
adoption are n less the licensing fee. The monopolist's opportunity cost is the Nash
equilibrium profit of the old product monopolist, written n , since the inventor will sell to
a new entrant if the monopolist declines to adopt. Thus 11-11 is the maximum revenue
that the inventor can gain by licensing to the old product monopolist. Now, as long as v < v
< v we have II > II +11 , i.e. joint monopoly yields strictly greater industry profits
than does differentiated duopoly, and it is apparent that the inventor's best policy is to license
to the old product monopolist (this is an instance of Gilbert and Newbery's [1982]
"persistence of monopoly" result).
In view of Proposition 2, it is simple to compare competition and threatened
monopoly for the nondrastic case: we have n < n , since the entrant cuts into the old
15
product monopolist's market, and thus n -II >n -II =n when innovation is
nondrastic under joint monopoly. In this case, the replacement effect is mitigated by the
threat of entry. The resulting dominance of the product inertia effect means that threatened
monopoly provides strictly greater returns to innovation than does competition. In Appendix
A B
1 we extend this conclusion to the interval (v ,v ), on which innovation is nondrastic under
dominant-fringe structure but not under joint monopoly. This establishes:
Proposition 3. (a) If v < v < v , then FI -EI > n , and threatened monopoly provides
strictly greater returns to innovation than does competition;
(b) If v > v , then II - n = n , and the two market structures provide the same
returns.
Finally we consider excluded monopoly. Since the inventor cannot license to the old
product monopolist, his maximum licensing revenue becomes n , and since n < II -
n for v < v < v it follows that excluded monopoly provides strictly lower returns to
C ND
innovation than does threatened monopoly. In Appendix 1 we demonstrate n < II for
these levels of v, and this gives:
Proposition 4. (a) If v < v < v , then II - n > II > II , and excluded monopoly
provides returns to innovation that are strictly between those of threatened monopoly and
competition;
(b) If v > v , then n - n = FI = n , and all of the market structures provide the
same returns.
The superiority of excluded monopoly over competition in the nondrastic case
illustrates how the product inertia effect is sensitive to the intensity of competition from the
16
old product market. Differentiated duopoly conveys greater market power in the new-product
market than does dominant-fringe structure, and as a consequence innovation under excluded
monopoly generates more rents for the inventor to extract. This suggests a more general
conclusion: if innovation is nondrastic, then returns to innovation rise as the old product
market becomes more concentrated.5 In this way, product inertia implies a direct link
between monopoly power and innovation incentives, which is distincdy different from the
link that arises from the replacement effect.
5. Social Welfare
In this section we consider normative aspects of the structure of intergenerational
product competition. While competition in the old product market yields better allocative
efficiency for a given set of products, monopoly may give rise to innovation that would not
occur under competition. Monopoly may then be superior on balance if the innovation is of
r
sufficient value. Let SNA denote the social surplus obtaining from competition in the old
M
product market when the new product is not adopted, and let S. denote the surplus
associated with an old product monopoly that adopts the new product. This tradeoff between
market structures is made explicit in the following proposition, which is proved in Appendix
1:
* * B C M * C
Proposition 5. There exists v
,
satisfying v < v < v , such that SNA > S A if v < v , S^ *
M * C M *
= S A if v = v , and Svr <, < S » if v > v .
*
According to this proposition, there is always a level v such that for v above this
level, monopoly with adoption provides strictly greater social surplus that competition
without adoption. It follows that normative comparison of the market structures depends on
5 We will examine this conjecture in greater detail in a forthcoming paper.
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the incentives that are provided to adopt the new product, together with the value of the
innovation. Let us consider the very simple situation in which the inventor must incur a
fixed R&D cost of F > in order to bring forth the new product. This can be thought of as a
limiting case in which rivalry to acquire the patent does not affect the realized level of R&D
expenditures; we defer to Section 6a the more detailed case of patent races between rival
potential inventors. In the present instance, adoption of the new product occurs if and only if
the returns from adoption exceed F. It is clear from Proposition 2 that competition provides
strictly greater social welfare than protected monopoly, since n > n -II implies that
adoption occurs under competition whenever it occurs under protected monopoly.
Threatened monopoly may provide greater welfare than competition, however, since we have
rrM nOD nC f Bn -n >n forv<v<v.
The latter comparison is illustrated in Figure 2, which depicts n - n and n as
r
functions of v for a given specification of the functions f^((d) and fN(cu).6 For F < n ,
adoption occurs under both threatened monopoly and competition, while for F > n - n
adoption occurs under neither; in these regions competition is superior based on allocative
efficiency. In the area between the curves, labelled Regions 1, 2 and 3, adoption occurs
M
under threatened monopoly but not under competition. In Regions 1 and 2 we have S A - F <
C
SNA , so competition remains superior. In Region 3, however, the value of innovation is
great enough to outweigh the efficiency advantage of competition, and the inequality is
reversed. In this region it is threatened monopoly that provides the greater social welfare.
Interestingly, in Region 1 social welfare under monopoly would be greater if the
M
monopolist did not adopt the innovation (SNA denotes surplus under monopoly in the old
6 In particular, we specify f (co) = fN(a>) = co. Figure 2 is calculated for the values Cq = 4/7
A B
and C^ = 6/7; this gives y = 9/7, v =1.5 and v =6. The propositions hold for this example
despite the violation of the assumption f>^(0) < Cq; for f^((0) = fN(a)) = (0 the assumption may
be replaced by Cq > 1/2.
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product market when the new product is not adopted). This exemplifies the familiar
proposition that rivalry may lead to socially excessive innovation, where in this instance it is
product market rivalry, rather than rivalry to acquire the patent, that leads to excessive
adoption. Finally, excluded monopoly and competition may be compared by noting that the
curve n lies between n -11 and n , so that the areas corresponding to Regions 1, 2
and 3 become smaller.
6. Extensions
a. Rivalry in the Innovative Activity
In the preceding analysis we have assumed the point of view of an inventor whose
innovation decision is essentially static, and who faces no rivals in the innovative activity.
Actual R&D activity, however, has important dynamic aspects and frequently involves
intense rivalry among potential discoverers of the innovation. Further, rivalry typically
affects the amount of R&D expenditures that are undertaken, and thereby exerts an added
effect on net social surplus. In this section we extend our analysis to allow the timing of
innovation to be determined by a simple deterministic patent race. The main new finding is
that in situations where delaying innovation generates large reductions in R&D costs, product
inertia may become favorable for welfare, due to its tendency to slow innovation and thereby
to mitigate against excessive R&D expenditures.
We consider a patent race model similar to that of Gilbert and Newbery [1982].
There is a pool of potential innovators, any of whom can discover the innovation at time T
by paying an R&D cost of F(T). Time is continuous, and F(T) is positive and strictly
decreasing in T; the assumption of declining R&D costs can be justified in terms of
complementary discoveries in other sectors, or diseconomies stemming from compression of
research activity. When one innovator makes the discovery at T, he obtains a patent on the
product, and his subsequent profits are determined as above. We analyze the natural analog
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of subgame-perfect equilibria for this continuous-time setting.
Suppose first that the pool of potential innovators includes any agent that desires to
make the R&D investment, so that R&D activity is disintegrated from the production process
for the new product; we call this disintegrated R&D. Innovation occurs as soon as R&D
costs exactly dissipate all rents available from the patent. In the case of competition, for
example, the equilibrium discovery time is determined by:
nc
(4) __-F(T) =
r
where r is the rate of discount, and we have assumed for simplicity that the flow of profits
from the new product continues unchanged for all time. The discovery time is determined
similarly for protected and threatened monopoly.
Let us now consider social surplus in patent race equilibria for the specification of
Figure 2, where we also set F(T) = F(0)e" . The parameter d > indicates the rate at which
R&D costs decline over time. Further, we put F(0) = 11 -II , i.e. time zero is taken to
be the instant at which adoption occurs under threatened monopoly; measuring discounted
social surplus at T = then serves to maximize the relative advantage of threatened
monopoly versus competition.7
The results are summarized in Figure 3. For v < v , adoption occurs sooner under
threatened monopoly than under competition. But threatened monopoly gives greater
equilibrium social surplus than competition only on Region 1, where d is small and the value
of innovation is relatively high. The small d case approximates the static situation of Section
7 Measuring social surplus at other times will increase the weight placed on times at which
adoption has occurred under neither or both threatened monopoly and competition, and at such
times competition is more attractive. Thus our results give an upper bound on the attractiveness
of threatened monopoly. Issues of timing and social welfare are considered further in DeBrock
andMasson [1985].
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5; in particular, as d approaches negative infinity, the patent race outcomes converge to the
points on the curve n - n in Figure 2, and it follows from above that threatened
monopoly is superior if v is sufficiently large. For larger d, delayed adoption leads to greater
marginal reductions in R&D costs, and as a consequence the slower adoption makes
competition more attractive. Here product inertia becomes desireable precisely because it
slows innovation.
A similar effect arises when competition and protected monopoly are compared.
Adoption occurs no later under competition, but in Region 4 social surplus is greater under
protected monopoly due to the savings in R&D costs resulting from slower adoption. Now it
is the replacement effect that becomes relatively favorable for welfare. Interestingly, the
relative advantage of protected monopoly increases as v rises, since an increase in v serves to
widen the gap between adoption times. Finally, threatened monopoly is superior to protected
monopoly only on Regions 1 and 2, where again the slower adoption under protected
monopoly becomes attractive when d is large.
We have assumed thus far that R&D activities and production of the new product may
be carried out by distinct agents. Let us now consider the alternative possibility that R&D is
directly related to the production process, so that the producing firm must pay its own R&D
cost rather than licensing from an outsider; this is called integrated R&D. We assume as
before that the first firm to pay the R&D cost wins a patent over the new product, and that
profits from the new product continue unchanged for all time.
The distinction between integrated and disintegrated R&D is immaterial under
competition, as any firm can produce the new product; thus (4) continues to give the
equilibrium discovery time. Protected monopoly is affected, however, since integrated R&D
gives the old-product producer a monopoly over the innovative activity. Now the firm
chooses its discovery time to maximize profits net of R&D costs, and the first-order
condition for this maximization is:
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nM _ n0M F , (T)
F(T) + — =
Since F' < 0, it follows that discovery occurs strictly later when R&D is integrated.
ND
Threatened monopoly is similarly affected, except that new entrants can earn n by
innovating, and this places an upper bound on how long the threatened monopolist can delay
innovation.
Figure 4 summarizes equilibrium social surplus in the integrated R&D case, for the
same specification of the model as in Figure 3. For low values of d, the reductions in R&D
costs from delay are small relative to the surplus that consumers earn from the new product,
so that delay is excessive under protected and threatened monopoly. Thus Region 1, on
which threatened monopoly is superior to competition, is smaller here than in the
disintegrated R&D case of Figure 3. For large d, in contrast, delay leads to large cost
reductions, and protected and threatened monopoly become relatively more attractive; note
that Region 4, on which protected monopoly dominates competition, becomes much larger
under integrated R&D due to the added delay under protected monopoly.
b. Rivalry in the New Product Market
Thus far we have assumed that the new product is controlled exclusively by a
patent-holding inventor. In many cases, however, patent protection is not available to
developers of new products, and there arises rivalry between firms that market different
variants of the new technology. In this section we show that product inertia continues to play
a fundamental role when there is the potential for rivalry in the new product market.
We now suppose that two firms produce the old product. Each has the option of
adopting the new product at a cost of F. We consider a two-stage game between these firms:
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In the first stage the firms choose simultaneously whether or not to market the new product.
In the second stage, the firms choose quantities to produce, where the new product can be
produced only if the firm had decided to market it in the first stage, while the old product can
be produced irrespective of the stage one decision. Demand and costs take the same form as
above. We study subgame-perfect equilibria of this game, in which the quantity decisions
give Nash equilibria of the second stage for every possible adoption profile in the first stage. 8
Figure 5 summarizes the pure-strategy adoption equilibria in terms of of F and v, for
the specification considered in Figure 2.9 In Regions la-d, neither firm adopts due to the
high adoption costs. In Region 2 only one firm adopts, and in Regions 3a-b both firms adopt.
Under threatened monopoly, in contrast, there is no adoption in Regions la and lb, while
adoption occurs in the remaining regions. Thus Region 1c and Id are associated with
outcomes in which adoption fails to occur in the duopoly case, even though a threatened
monopolist would adopt. Here product inertia derives from the rival producer of the old
product: although either firm could adopt and acquire a monopoly position in the new
product market, the presence of the rival reduces the returns to adoption and makes it
unattractive relative to threatened monopoly.
Let us now compare the adoption equilibria to the adoption profiles that would
maximize social surplus. Social surplus is calculated under the assumption that outputs are
determined by Cournot quantity-setting, i.e. imperfect competition in the quantity stage is
8 R&D rivalry in a differentiated duopoly has been considered in a number of recent papers:
Shaked and Sutton [1990] analyze an adoption game similar to ours for abstract reduced-form
profit functions; Ramey [1988] and Bagwell and Staiger [1990] consider models with random
R&D outcomes; and Beath, Katsoulacos and Ulph [1987], Scotchmer and Green [1990], Dutta.
Lach and Rustichini [1990] and Aoki [1991] study the nature of leader-follower relationships
when a sequence of product improvements can be adopted.
9 Duopoly equilibria are unique on the interiors of Regions 1 and 3, in which neither adopt or
both adopt. In Region 2, there exist a pair of asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria in which only
one firm adopts, as well as a single symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium.
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taken as a constraint. In Regions la and 1c of Figure 5, nonadoption maximizes social
surplus, while in Regions lb, Id, 2 and 3a the highest social surplus is associated with
adoption by only one firm. Adoption by both firms is optimal only in Region 3b. It follows
that adoption is suboptimally low in Regions lb and Id, as a consequence of product inertia
together with incomplete appropriability of consumer surplus, while adoption is suboptimally
high in Region 3a. In the latter region, which is associated with relatively high v for given F,
most of the gains in consumer surplus are generated by the initial adoption, and the cost of
the second adoption outweighs the gain in surplus from having lower concentration in the
new-product market.
7. Conclusion
Our analysis demonstrates that for a widely observed pattern of product innovation, in
which old and new products compete for a common customer base, monopoly may provide
greater incentives for innovation than does competition. The key new effect is product
inertia, wherein competition from the old product reduces the rents available from the new.
When innovation is nondrastic under monopoly, our model demonstrates that the incentives
to innovate under competition and protected monopoly are identical. Further, incentives are
strictly greater under monopoly when the monopolist is threatened. Threatened monopoly
may provide greater social welfare than competition when the innovation is sufficiently
valuable to offset the allocative efficiency of competition, and realized R&D costs are not
excessively sensitive to rivalry in the innovative activity.
Stated more briefly, monopoly threatened with entry gives greater social welfare when
innovations are valuable and adoption costs are high, while competition is best when
adoption costs are low. This welfare analysis suggests a classification of industries by scope
for innovation. Highly innovative sectors in which entirely new markets emerge from rapid
technological progress (computers, communication equipment, biotech) may provide greater
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welfare when markets are monopolized. In sectors where new technologies are less
fundamental and innovation takes the form of nonprice competition via small product
improvements (food and household items, apparel), welfare is higher under competition,
since the gains from innovation are small. As pointed out above, this classification may be
reversed if excessive R&D expenditures become the dominant consideration.
In future work we plan to explore in more detail the link between concentration in old
and new product markets and R&D incentives. Further, in this paper we have taken the
degree of product improvement to be exogeneous, and it would be useful to assess the effect
of market structure on firms' product improvement decisions, as well as to incorporate
spillovers in product design into the analysis. Cost-reducing, quality-reducing innovation can
also be considered within our basic framework. Overall, we feel that explicit consideration
of intergenerational product competition will continue to provide rich insights into the nature
of innovation incentives.
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Appendix 1
Proofs of Propositions and Lemma
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the following three lemmata.
A MLemma Al. There exists v > v defined jointly with QN by:
(Ala) -f£(l - Q^J) qJJ + fQ(l - Qn) - c = °
(Alb) -v%(l - Q*J) Q^J + v%(l - Q^J) - CN =
A
such that innovation is nondrastic under joint monopoly when v < v < v , and drastic when v
>> A> v .
Proof. The profits of a joint monopolist may be written, using (la) and (lb):
(A2) n = tfO(1
" Q0- QN ) " C ]Q
+ [vfNd - QN) - f (l - Q ) + f (l - Q - QN ) - CN] QN
Under our assumptions (A2) is a strictly concave function; let Qq and QN denote the unique
M
maximizers of (A2). We have QN > as a consequence of v > v. The remaining
possibilities are Qq > 0, which constitutes nondrastic innovation, and Q^ = 0, which is
M M
drastic innovation. Qq and QN in the nondrastic case are characterized by:
(A3a) -f6< '
" Qo " Qn > Wo + QnI + fo' ' " Qo " Qn > " co = °
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(A3b) -fQ(l - ($ - QjJ)< + qMj . [vf^(1 . qM } . %(1 . QM}] QM
+ vfNd - Ojj) - f d - Q^) + f (1 - Q • QN } - CN = °
and in the drastic case by:
(A4a) -f£( 1 - Q^) Q™ + fQ ( 1 - Q*J) - CQ <
(A4b) -vf^(l - Q*J) Q^} + vfN(l -
QM)
- CN =
Let Q^r be the level of (\t that gives equality in (A4a). Since Q^ < 1 necessarily, we may
choose v sufficiently close to v to give:
vf
N( 1 -^- CN = fO(1 "QN) + CO <0
IfQ^>Q^,then:
vfN(l-Q^)-CN -f (l-Q^) + C
i-Qn
= vfN (l - Q£) - CN - fQ(l - Q£) + CQ - J [vf
' (a» - f ' (a))]d© <
1-0M
^N
M
Thus if Qxj satisfied (A4b) we would have:
= -vf^(l-Q^)Q^ + vfN(l-Q^)-CN
<-f6(l-QN)QN + fO(1 -QN)- C
and (A4a) would be violated. It follows that innovation must be nondrastic for v sufficiently
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close to v.
Observe next that our assumptions imply, for all co > 0:
f (a» - fN(a>) - f£(a» [1 - co] + f^(cu) [1 - a>]
< f£(0) * c
Rearranging gives:
-f£(o» [1 - ©] + f (a>) - CQ < -f^(Q)) [1 - a>] + fN(co)
and at 0) = 1 - Q^ we have:
o =
-fod - Q$ Qn + f (' " Qn> " co < "W 1 " On) % +V 1 " %>
It follows that for sufficiently large v:
-vfN(1
" QN) QN + vfN(1 -QN ) - CN >0
M /
and (A4b) will be satisfied by QN > Qxr, which implies satisfaction of (A4a). Thus
innovation is drastic for sufficiently large v.
M
Note finally that the QN satisfying (A4b) is strictly increasing in v, which implies
that once innovation is drastic at a given v, it continues to be drastic for all larger v. From
A(Ala) and (Alb) we have that innovation is nondrastic when v < v and drastic when v >
v
A Q.E.D.
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B A LLemma A2. There exists v > v defined jointly with QN by:
(A5a) fO(1
" QN) " CO =
(A5b) -v\(l - Q^) Q^ + vB fN(l - Qjj) - CN =
such that innovation is nondrastic under dominant-fringe structure when v < v < v , and
drastic when v > v
C L
Proof. Let Qq denote the fringe supply. If the new product monopolist chooses Q^ < QN ,
L C
where QN is defined by (A5a), then Q^ is determined by the requirement that price equal
marginal cost in the old product market:
fo(l-Qg-QN)-Co =
L C L L
while if QN ^ Qxr we have Qq = 0; thus QN is the limit quantity. If QN ^ Qxr, then the
monopolist's profits are:
n = [vfN(l - QN) - fQ(l - QN) + CQ - cN] QN
C L C
which is a strictly concave function. Let Qvr denote its maximizer on [0,QN]; we have Q-^ >
C L C
as a consequence of v > v. If QN < QN , then QN is characterized by:
(A6) -[vf^(l -
Q<J)
- f£(l - g£)] Qg
+ vfN(l-Q^)-fo(l-Q^) + Co -CN =
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If instead we have QN > Qxr, then the monopolist's profit function is:
n = [vfN(l - QN) - cN ] qn
which again is strictly concave. Let QN denote the maximizer of this function over all
quantities, including QN < QN ; thus QN is defined by (A4b), with Qxr replacing Qxr. It
C L
follows that innovation is drastic as long as Qvr > Qxr, since the new product monopolist may
c c c
simply implement the unconstrained profit maximum by choosing QN = Qxr, while if Qxr <
Qvr the presence of the competitive fringe affects the monopolist's profits, so that innovation
C C
is nondrastic. In the latter case the monopolist's optimal choice is QN = Qxr. Note that we
r
may have Qq = when innovation is nondrastic, if the monopolist elects to pursue a "limit
C L
pricing" strategy by choosing Qxr = Qxr.
The argument of Lemma Al is easily modified to establish that innovation is
nondrastic for v sufficiently close to v (replace Qx\ with QN). Further, the condition f^(0) <
Cq implies:
(A7) -f^(l - Q{j) Qjj + fN(l - Qjj) >
C L C
so that QN > QN for sufficiently large v. Since QN is strictly increasing in v, it follows that
a v > v exists having the desired property. Finally, at v = v we have QN = Qxr and thus
/~\ s~\ t DA
QN satisfies (Ala); this implies Qxr < Qxr, so that we must have v > v . Q.E.D.
D
Lemma A3. Innovation is nondrastic under differentiated duopoly when v < v < v , and
r> p>
drastic when v > v , where v is defined by (A5a)-(A5b).
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Proof. Under differentiated duopoly the profit functions for the old and new monopolists
respectively are:
n = [f (i-Qo-QN)-c ]Q
nN = [vfN (l - QN) - fQ(l - QN) + fQ(l - QQ QN) - CN ] QN
Let the Nash equilibrium quantities be denoted Q~ and QN . As in the preceding two
lemmas, v > v assures QN > 0. Equilibria with Q~ > are characterized by:
(A8a) -f£(l - qg - Q°) Qg + fQ(l - og - Q°) - CQ =
(A8b) -[vf£( 1 - Qg) - f£( 1 - Qn> + {q( 1 - Qq " Q&>1 Qn
+ vfN(l - q£) - f (l - Qg) + fQ(l - Qg - Qg) - CN =
while for Qq = it is necessary and sufficient that:
(A9a) f
o
(l-Q^)-C
o
<0
(A9b) -vf^( 1 - Qg) Q° + vfN ( 1 - Qg) - CN =
Under our assumptions, (A8a)-(A8b) and (A9a)-(A9b) define downward-sloping and
continuous reaction functions in the space of quantity pairs, and moreover these reaction
functions have one and only one intersection; thus Qq and QN are uniquely defined.
Innovation is drastic in this case if and only if Q~ = 0. Comparing (A5a) and (A9a),
it follows that innovation is drastic under differentiated duopoly if and only if Q^ > Qvr, and
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DC • •
in the latter instance we have QN = Qxr since (A9b) coincides with (A4b). Thus, innovation
is drastic under differentiated duopoly precisely when it is drastic under dominant-fringe
structure. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma, (a) The profit function of an old-profit monopolist who does not adopt the
new product are:
n =[f d - Q ) - c ] q
and the unique maximizer Qq is defined by:
(A10) fO(1_(^0 ) ^O " fO(1 "^0 ) " CO =
A M M MM
Since v < v < v , Qq and QN are defined by (A3a)-(A3b), and substituting Qq + QN =
Qq
M
into (A3a) gives (A10).
M
(b) Subtracting (A3a) from (A3b) gives a condition equivalent to (A6), with QN replacing
C • CQ^. Thus the result holds if (A6) determines QN , that is, the dominant firm does not choose
the limit pricing strategy, when v < v < v . Now, (Ala)-(Alb) imply QN < Qvr when v =
v , while subtracting (A5a) from (A5b) gives (A6) with QN replacing Qvj; this establishes
C C
that QN is determined by (A6) at v = v . It is also true that QN is strictly increasing in v at
v = v , for differentiation of (A6) gives:
SO
(Al l) sign[ —£ ] = sign[-f^(l - q£) q£ + f (l - q£)]
dv
= signed - Q^J) Q^ + fN(l - Q^)] >
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where the inequality follows from (Alb). Moreover, the second term in (All) remains
C C
positive for smaller QN , so that QN continues to be an increasing function of v at lower levels
JC L A C
of v, trusCr< QM for all v < v < v , and consequently QM is determined by (A6). Q.E.D.'it lvji n v -v v ^^ v u u ^uiiov-^ju^iiu y ^VT
Proof of Proposition 2. It remains to consider the case of v > v . Note first that Qxt < Qxt
A B
for v < v < v : this may be seen by subtracting (A4a), which holds with strict inequality,
C L
from (A4b) and comparing with (A6), when QN < QN ; and by comparing (A4b) with (A5b),
using (A7), when QN = QN . Further, QN = QN for v > v . Let us now make the
C M r-rC M
dependence on v explicit by writing n and fl as n (v) and n (v). We have:
nc (v) - (nM(v) - n0M )
C A M A OM \ dYlC{i) dYlM{i)
= nc(v ) - (n (v ) - nU ) + j [ ]dt
A dt d t
v
min{v,v }
= J [fNd-Q^QN-W 1-^^^
v
using Qxt < Qxt ^ Qxt over the relevant interval, together with the fact that fxr(l - Qxt) Qvt
is strictly increasing in QN for QN ^ Qxt, which follows from (A7). Q.E.D.
The proofs of Propositions 3 and 4 make use of the following lemmata:
Lemma A4. If v < v < v , then Qq < Qxt.
C L
Proof If Qxt < Qxt, we have, using (A6):
33
=
- f6<' - Q& <$ +W 1 - Qn» + C
QN is determined by (A4b), and from the proof of Proposition 2 we know Q^ < Qvr; thus:
and so:
-vfN(1 " QN } Qn + vfN (1 " QN} • CN < °
-fAd - q£) q£ +
f
nd - q£) + cn < olOvl vN y VN T xOVi vNy T "O
D CQq > Qvr would then imply:
-f6a-Qo-QN»Qo + fo( 1 -oS-QN)- co <0
C L D D C
which contradicts (A8a). If Q^, = QN , then the result follows from Q~ + QN < (Xt, which
uses (A5a) and (A8a). Q.E.D.
R CO DO
Lemma A5. If v < v < v , then sign[(Vr - Qxj] = signfCv - Qq].
C L
Proof. Suppose first that QN < QN - Subtracting (A8a) from (A8b) gives:
-Kia - qB) - fAci - q5)i qB + vfMd - qS) - fnd - qS)vNy * vl vNyjvN" lNvl VN ; xOvl VINF
If Qq > Qvy, then the last term on the left-hand side of this expression is strictly positive.
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Since the remaining terms of the left-hand side have the same form as (A6), it follows that
(A6) evaluated at QN is strictly negative when QQ > QN , and so QN < QN ; similarly for Qq
<
Q*J.
If Q^ = Q^, then Q® < Q^ follows at once from Qq + Qn < $£• To show QN >
Qq, let v ' denote the smallest v such that QN = QN ; we have QN < QN at v = v ' , so Qv. <
Qvt for v slightly below v'. Thus Qq < QN holds for v slightly below v\ and since QN is
strictly increasing in v and Qq strictly decreasing in v for v < v < v , Qq < QN continues to
hold for larger v. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. It is convenient in this instance to consider parameterization by Cq
rather than v. Thus we fix v and define Cq by:
vfN(l)-CN = f (l)-C
Viability of the new product requires Cq > Cq. By arguments analogous to those of
A B A B
Lemmas A1-A3 it follows that there exist Cq and Cq, with Cq < Cq < Cq, such that
innovation is nondrastic under joint monopoly if and only if Cq < Cq < Cq, and nondrastic
under dominant-fringe structure and differentiated duopoly if and only if Cq < Cq < Cq.
A B AWe complete the proof by considering the region Cq < Cq < Cq (corresponding to v < v <
B
v ). Making explicit the dependence of profits on Cq, we may write:
(Ai2) nM - n0D(cQ) - n
c(c ) = {nM - ii0D(Cq) - nc(CQ)}
c
o dn0D dnc
+ f [
+ ]dCQ
Cq dC dC
where n is independent of Cq due to Cq > Cq. The term in braces vanishes since
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innovation is drastic under all three market structures when Cq > Cq. To ease notation we
will use a lower bar to indicate that a function is evaluated at 1 - Q~ - QN , and an upper bar
to indicate that a function is evaluated at 1 - QN . The result follows if the integrand in (A12)
is positive; this integrand may be written:
(A13) ST
- +^
=
"-o Qo^ + Qn
^i-f6QSH6'QN +y + AQS)
where A, which derives from the reaction functions under differentiated duopoly, is given by:
The term in braces in (A13) may be written:
(A14) ft £ Qg Q
D
. [f^qg . ft £ [QD + qD, qC + 3%]2QC
+ %' QS- 2f6i«vfN' - f6''QS- 2 [vfN- F6» Qn
The last term in (A14), which includes the product of expressions in braces, is strictly
positive, and the remaining terms may be written:
(A15) ft £ Q° [Qg - QC] + [f6 ]2[3QC - qg] . £< £ QD qD
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C DThe third term in (A15) is evidently positive. By Lemma A4 we have QN > Q~ and the
second term is strictly positive. If QN > Qxr, then we have Qq > QN , by Lemma A5, butCD DC
these inequalities contradict QN > (X-y thus Qxr < Qxr and the first term is positive. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. We may write:
(Ai6) ri^V) - nc (v) = ri^cy) - nc (Y )
v an™ dif
+ J[ ]dv
d v dv
v
Since n (v) = n (v) = 0, we must show that the integrand in (A16) is strictly positive:
dn an n d d d d ^o
(A17) 1 J- =W QN» QN " f0" " % - <$ QN T^dv dv dv
-fN(i-Q^)QS
Since Q^ is strictly decreasing in v, the second term on the right-hand side of (A 17) is
strictly positive. Further, it was established above that fN(l - QN) QN is strictly increasing
in QN for QN < Qxr, so the result holds if QN > QN . Now, there is a v ' such that QQ > Qyr
D C
for v < v < v', and thus by Lemma A5 we have QN ^ QN on this interval.
Next consider parameterization by Cq as in Proposition 3:
(Ai8) it^Cq) - nc(c ) = n^cc*) - nc(cg)
-\ [ ]dCQ
c ^
c
o
dc
o
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The integrand in (A 18) must be strictly negative. Using lower bars to denote evaluation at 1
- Qq - Qxt and upper bars to denote evaluation at 1 - QN , we have:
tA ' 9) ^ ^
= "
fO QN^- QN
= i <-£ q£ 0v%' - ft' + £'] Q° - 2[vF^ - ^ $) - AQC )
where A is defined in the proof of Proposition 3. The expression in braces in (A19) may be
written:
i-ft' ft Qn + 2iy
2
- ft «
vf
N' - ft'i <£ - 2^n - ft» ' • toS - Q&
-
<-ft ' ft <$ + [ft]
2
+
tft' <$ - ft' «vFn' - ft 'i Qn - 2 tvtN - ft» > qS
D C
which is strictly negative as long as QN < Qxt. By Lemma A5 we know that the latter is true
for CA < Cq < Cq, for some CA. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. Social surplus when the new product has been adopted by a joint
monopolist is:
i-qJJ i
S^ = max(Q°M
-Q^,0} \ (f (a» - C )da> + j (vfN(o» - CN)do)
1Q§M i-Q?J
It can be shown using (3a) and (3b) that QN is strictly increasing in v for v < v < v , while
M AM
we have already noted that QN is strictly increasing in v for v > v ; thus S. is strictly
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increasing in v. Social surplus under competition in the old product market when the new
product has not been adopted is given by:
1
SNA = / (fO(C0) " C )dG)
where QN is given by (A5a). Now, QN -> as v -> v, while QN > Qq follows from (A5a
*NA A close to v. At v = v , in co
from (A4b) and (A5b), and moreover (A4a) and (A4b) imply:
and (A10); thus Sj^ > ST for v ", ntrast, we have Q^ = Q^,
vfN(l-Qj})-CN >f (l-Q*p.C
M C R MC * *
Thus ST > S^ for v = v . It follows that S> = S^A for a unique v satisfying v < v <
v
B
,
with SA < S^A for v < v* and SA > S^A for v > v*. Q.E.D.
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Appendix 2
Robustness of the Equality of Returns
In this appendix we demonstrate that the equality of returns under competition and
protected monopoly is robust, in the sense that for appropriate perturbations of utility
functions, either structure may yield strictly greater returns than the other. First, for given
Q and QN, the utility of consumer ox^, which will be denoted LLr, is given by:
UN = f (l-QN)-f d-Q -QN )
Since UN is strictly increasing in Qq, we can recast the joint monopolist's profit
M
maximization problem in terms of QN and UN, and there will be unique maximizers Q^ and
M
Uvr. In the dominant-fringe case, UN is given by:
UN = f d-QN)-C
Again Uvr is increasing in Q^, so we can think of the new-product monopolist as choosing a
profit-maximizing level U-vr. It is easy to see that UN > Uvr when v < v .
We now consider perturbations of the utility function that have the form g(vfN (co) -
PN), where g' > and g(U) > U for all U. The utility of the old product is held fixed, which
ensures that n is unaffected by the perturbation. Now fix a constant X with UN <X<
ILt, and suppose g(U) > U if and only if U < X. If the joint monopolist chooses QN and
M
Uvr in the same way as before the perturbation, then P~ is unchanged if the perturbation is
slight, while P^ becomes strictly greater; thus the maximized profit level is strictly greater
c
following the perturbation. Under dominant-fringe structure, in contrast, choosing U^ gives
the same level of- profits, since utility is unaffected for U > X, while offering utility levels U
40
r
< X will continue to be unattractive if the perturbation is sufficiently slight; thus n is
unaffected. It follows that we have n - n > n following the perturbation, and returns
are strictly greater under protected monopoly. By a symmetric argument, it follows that
competition will provide strictly greater returns following perturbations such that g(U) > U if
and only if U > X.
We can interpret the perturbations in terms of cross-product interactions obtaining
from the new product when utility is low, whereby consuming the new product boosts the
utility derived from the consumer's entire consumption bundle.
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